Munitions and Mines:
Peace Education for Laos
From the end of the Vietnam War to 1994, 10,000 Laotians fell casualty to the
millions of pieces of UXO within their borders. The author recounts the role of
Mennonite Central Commitee and other NGOs in reversing this situation.
By Titus Peachey, Mennonite Central Committee
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Phonsavanh, the
capital of Xieng
Khouang
province, is
situated on a high
rolling plateau.
c/oMCCU.S.

t was 8:00 one morning in March of 1998, when Phou
Vieng, a villager in the northern Lao province ofXieng
Khouang, was preparing his work for the day. Having
recently built a simple house for his family, his first task
for the morning was to dig several shallow holes in the
earthen floor to anchor his bed. After measuring and
marking the places where his bedposts would lodge, he
prepared his digging tool and squarred beside the first mark.
In one short stroke, his life was forever changed.
AJl Phou Vieng can remember is the sound of the explosion. Hundreds of shards of steel tore into his body
from a cluster bomb buried just beneath the soil. One of
the pieces of shrapnel punctured a nearby can of gasoline,
and it burst into flames. Fortunately, neighbors gathered
quickly and carried Phou Vieng to safety, but his house
and all the family's belongings were burned.
The bomblet in Phou Vieng's house was dropped as
part of a massive U.S. bombing campaign that flew more
than 580,000 missions over Laos between 1964 and 1973.
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This equals roughly one mission for every five inhabitants
of the country and an average of one bombing mission
every eight minutes around rhe clock during the entire
nine years. Researchers estimate that approximately 90
million submunitions were dropped during the bombing
campaign. With a dud rare of I 0-30 percent, well over 9
million pieces of UXO were left behind. This ordnance,
much of it cluster munitions, has now lain in the ground
for over 25 years and becomes less stable and more
dangerous with each passing year.
When the war ended, hundreds of thousands of Lao
villagers who had fled the bombing returned to their homes.
In most cases, everything had been destroyed. They had to
rebuild their homes, repair the paddy dikes in their rice
fields, and open up the soil with shovels and hoes. They
carried on this imensive work in the midst of a staggering
array of still-lethal UXO littering the soil. Unknown to
them, their villages and surrounding fields had become
one vast, unmarked mine field. With no one to help them,
these villagers were trapped. In 1994, I asked one villager
why he cominued to grow vegetables in a location with
bomblets, or "bombies" as they are often called. He
responded, "I can't move my garden. There wouldn't be
any point to it anyway. Ifi moved it ro a new location, I'd
just find more bombies there. So I might as well keep it
where it is."
Thongsavanh, a reacher in Xieng Khouang province
during the war years, remembers instructing his students
ro pick up the strange round pieces of ordnance that
appeared in the forests and hillsides near his school. "I didn't
know it was dangerous," he recalled. "I thought since the
bombies hadn't blown up on impact they weren't dangerous
anymore."
Typically, when villagers found ordnance in their fields
and gardens, they simply removed it with their bare hands.
They found within themselves a courage borne out of
necessity. Farming was their livelihood and the only land
available to them was filled with bombs. Indeed, with the
passage of time, villagers became almost casual in their
approach to the ever-present bomb lets. An encounter I had

with Thong Dee, who was plowing his
field in Lek Village, illustrates this
attitude. When I asked Thong if any
bomblets had been turned up during
the plowing thus far, he matter-offactly replied that over 20 had been
plowed up the previous day. He had
thrown or placed some of the bomblets
into a hole at the edge of the plowed
field. As I walked over to the hole and
peered over the edge, Thong hurriedly
pulled away the weeds and scrap metal
he had placed on top to reveal the four
or five bomblets underneath. Noticing
that I was about to take a picture, he
quickly moved each bomblet into
clearer view, handling them like they
were merely billiard balls.
Sadly, not everyone was as lucky
as Thong Dee. Between the end of the
war in 1975 and the beginning of
clearance operations in 1994, more
than l 0,000 Lao villagers suffered
injury or death from UXO. In many
ways, the stories are remarkably similar
to the stories of accidents from
landmines. People are injured or killed
during their everyday activities such
as collecting firewood, herding carrie
or hoeing in their fields and gardens.
Because of their curious shapes
and colors, and because many of them
can be found easily accessible on top
of the soil, cluster munitions are
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almost irresistible to children. In fact,
over 25 percent of UXO-related
casualties happen to children, none of
whom were born when the bombs fell.
On Nov. 22, 1993, four Tu Va Chao
children were walking along a street
on the edge of Phonsavanh, Xieng
Khouang province's capital. They were
raking rhe water buffalo to pasture
when Kou Ya, four, and Sia Ya, six,

noticed a round object in the ditch. It
looked like the ball boys and girls toss
to each other during Hmong New Year
festivities. It was actually a cluster
bomb. Sia Ya threw it to her brother.
He couldn't catch it and it landed
behind him, exploding and killing him
instantly. Sia Ya died after two
agonizing days and nights in the
provincial hospital.
The story of the Chao children
illustrates yet another tragic aspect of
cluster bomb explosions. Compared to
land mines, cluster bombs have higher
explosive power and deadly fragmentation effects. They are designed
to kill. In Laos, 52 percent of all UXO
accidents have resulted in death.
In the period immediately after
the war, the Soviet Union assisted with
the clearance of a large state farm in
Xieng Khouang province. Aside from
this effort, rhe only assistance came
from two North American NGOs: the
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Bomb craters in Xieng Khaouang
province. c/o MCC U.S.

Mrs. Chao and
surviving children.
c/oMCCU.S.
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Mines Advisory
Group technician
searching for
UXO.

c/oMCCU.S.

Mennonite Central Committee
(MCC) and the American Friends
Service Committee. These groups
imported good-quality shovels for
agricultural use. Shovels were thought
to be somewhat safer to use than the
traditional Lao hoe, which was swung
from high over the head to turn the
soil. Shovels were gentler and perhaps
less likely to detonate a hidden
bombler. There were other experiments in these early years, such as an
MCC-supplied armored tractor with
a chain flail device on the front. These
experiments proved ineffective and
were eventually abandoned.
H owever, in 1994 the MCC, the
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and
the Lao government initiated a UXO
clearance project. The project quickly
drew the attention of U.N. agencies
and other governments. As funding

became available, the project grew.
From 1996-1998, over 122,000 pieces
of UXO were cleared; approximately
50-75 percent of UXO cleared were
cluster bombs. 1 By the year 2000,
eight international partners, in
cooperation with the Lao government
and local partners, were clearing UXO
in nine of the country's 18 provinces
and educating local people to the
dangers of UXO.
As MAG began working in Xieng
Khouang province, Laos, the newly
trained clearance teams encountered
a curious problem. Each morning,
when they arrived at the work site they
discovered, resting on top of the soil,
new cluster bombs that had not been
there the day before. The work site was
a large open area that was the future
site of a teacher's train ing college. A
conversation with the villagers across
the road from the worksite cleared up
the mystery.
It seems the villagers, who were
aware that cluster bombs were being
destroyed each day, decided to carry
cluster bombs from their village to the
clearance site each evening. In this way,
the bomblets from their village could
be destroyed, even though their village
had not been chosen for clearance.
This action by the villagers, while
extremely risky, also made a clear
statement about the presence ofUXO
in the vast affected areas of Laos. UXO
is everywhere, and clearance teams can

only begin to create tiny islands of
safety in a great sea of ordnance.
MAG and its counterpartS in the
Lao government responded quickly to
this action by the villagers. Rather than
putting all their resources into the subsurface clearance of a piece of land,
which would take months to clear,
they split the team in two. One team
remained to clear the site of the future
school, while the other team traveled
from village to village to destroy
bomblets on the surface posing an
immediate threat to life and safety.
Roving teams continue to destroy
bomblets on the surface but do not
make the ground safe for agricultural
use. The benefit of a roving team is
the immediate reduction in risk,
especially to children who are often
attracted to the toy-like appearance of
bomblets. Over a period of t ime,
however, the Lao rov ing teams
discovered that they could be called
back to the same area repeatedly.
Bomblets that bury themselves on
impact often work their way to the
surface as time passes. Through the
natural expansion and contraction of
the soil and erosion, new bomblets
appear where none could be seen
before.
In May 2000, I accompanied a
film crew to Laos to help produce a
documentary that will be shown on
public television. I watched as a bomb
clearance team prepared to blow up

nine bomblets that had been found on
a hillside used for grazing cattle. As
the team worked, my colleagues and I
spo tted four more bomblets on the
hillside. The metal shells of the
bomblets had just begun to appear
above the soil. This area had been
cleared before and will certainly have
to be cleared again.
April 2001 will mark the seventh
a nniversary of the beginning of
systematic UXO clearance in Laos.
Tremendous progress has been made
since the first team of 20 clearance
specialists was trained in 1994.
Hopefu lly, all the destroyed ordnance
has resulted in some reduced risk and
some tragedies have been avoided. It
is gratifYing to see these developments.
Despite all this work, there has
been linle reduction in the rates of
inj ury and death. Casualties still occur
at the rate of about one accident every
two days. As the Lao population grows
and the pressure on the land increases,
new areas will have to be opened up
for agricul t ura l production and
se ttlement. Much of this land will
present a serious UXO problem .
Ordnance clearance work will have to
continue in Laos for decades.
MCC's 25 years of history in Laos
an d ongoing struggle with the
problem of UXO has led it into the
arena of advocacy. As a people of faith
committed to peace and non-violence,
we could not visi t with families who

had experienced painful losses from
cluster munitions without asking the
larger questions about why and how
cluster munitions are used. As we
researched the continued production
and use of cluster munitions in
numerous conflicts around the globe,
we became convinced that serious
problems exist related to targeting, the
size of cluster bomb footprints and
dud rates.

MCC has joined other agencies
in issuing a Call for a Moratorium on
the production and use of cluster
munitions. As a result of our work in
Laos and our exposure to the UXO
problem on the civilian population in
post-war Iraq and Kosovo , MCC
believes it is time for the international
community to ban these weapons. •
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Over the past 35 years, in places
like Viemam, Laos, Cambodia, Sudan,
Yugoslavia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kosovo ,
Chechnya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and
Afghanistan, cluster muni tions have
had a persistent and tragic record of
indisc riminate killing. During
Operation Desert Storm, at least 25
U.S. military personnel were killed by
U.S. submunitions, and other U.S.
personnel we re injured. Cl u ster
munitions are an increasingly
significant o b stacle in va rious
peacekeeping operations.
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WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A LANDMIN E AND A CLUSTER MUNITION?
Cl uste r mun i tion s are sma ll
bomblets or submunitions which are
delivered to their targets in large
containers o r shells. The container
opens in mid-airoverthe target area,
often dispersing the bomblets over
an area the size of several football
fields. A drop of several canni st ers

can easily create kill zones of a
square kilometer or greater in size.
The bomblets may be the size and
shape of a law n dart, or an elongated soda can, and are designed to
explode on or shortly after impact.
The AP bomblet s have fragmenta-
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tion features w hich ca n send hundreds of shards of steel at ballist ic
speeds over a w ide area. Anti-armor
bombs have shaped charges which
can penetrate heavy armor. The
cluster munitions are delivered in a
bomb by ai rcraft, or launched by
rocket or artillery projectile.

The primary di ffe rence between
cluster munitions and landmines is
in their design.
Cluster munitions are designed to
explode as a result of their impact,
so that their effect is felt with in a
short rime of th ei r delivery.

Landmines are designed to explode as
a result of contact with or proximiry
ro a person. By design, their effects
may be felt many months after their
p lacement, depending on when a
perso n in itiates contact w ith the
landmine.
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Cluste r m unitions which fa il to
explode on impact, however, are very
similar in effect to landmines.
Since dud rates for cluster munitions
are often in t h e 10 p ercen r-30
percent ra n ge, mo st cluste r
munition strikes create the actual
effect of a mine field .

U.S. bomb on
display in front
of a home in
Phonsavanh,
Xieng
Khouang.
c!oMCCU.S.

